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ABSTRACT 
Research shows that analyst target price accuracy is limited and yet evidence on the 
factors driving this limited accuracy is inconclusive. Complementing the results of recent 
studies that show that the increasing incidence of cash flow forecasts in analyst reports 
has helped mitigate accruals mispricing, we address the question: are analyst target prices 
more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts than when they are not? Using 
propensity score matching to control for selection bias, we estimate the effect of 
disclosing cash flow forecasts on the target price accuracy of US stocks during 2000–
2010. The results suggest that target prices are more accurate when analysts also disclose 
cash flow forecasts. The paper contributes to the continuing debate about the usefulness 
of analyst target prices as well as the usefulness of analyst cash flow forecasts.  
 Keywords: Analysts, Cash flow forecasts, Target price accuracy, Valuation.  
JEL Classification: M41, G12, G24, G29, C35 
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1. Introduction 
Analysts are increasingly augmenting their equity reports, which include earnings 
forecasts as standard, with target price and cash flow forecasts. Unlike a stock 
recommendation, a target price gives investors an implicit estimate of the expected stock 
return over the forecast horizon, which can aid them in their investment decisions. In the 
analyst literature, however, some authors question the usefulness of target prices for 
capital market participants. More specifically, there is an unsettled debate on the limited 
accuracy of analyst target prices. At the same time, recent studies emphasize that analyst 
target prices are generally under-researched (e.g., Bradshaw, 2011; Bradshaw et al., 
2012). We contribute to this literature by examining the unresearched question of 
whether cash flow forecasts improve the accuracy of analyst target prices.  
Previous research examines some of the factors that influence target price accuracy, 
including analyst optimism (Asquith et al. 2005), the number of reports published by the 
analyst (Bonini et al. 2010), analyst valuation model choice (Demirakos et al. 2010), the 
text-based information depth of analyst reports (Kerl 2011), the collective reputation of 
analysts (Bonini et al. 2011), and past forecast accuracy (Bradshaw et al. 2012). The 
consistent result from these studies is the limited accuracy of analysts’ target prices 
compared to the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. In a sample of 818 target prices 
issued during 1997–1999 by Institutional Investor’s star analysts, Asquith et al. (2005) 
find that 54.3% of target prices are achieved within the following twelve months. Kerl 
(2011) finds a corresponding target price accuracy of 56.5% for a sample of 1,000 
German stocks during 2002–2004. Bonini et al. (2010) find an accuracy of 33.1% for a 
sample of 10,939 target prices issued during 2000–2006 for 98 Italian stocks. For a large 
sample of 492,647 target prices for US stocks during 2000–2009, Bradshaw et al. (2012) 
report an accuracy of 64% and a prediction error of 45%.  
    4 
 
The literature does not offer conclusive evidence on the factors that improve analyst 
target price accuracy. Some studies find larger target price forecast errors associated with 
higher target price boldness (Demirakos et al. 2010, De Vincentiis 2010, Kerl 2011), 
suggesting that analyst optimism reduces accuracy. On the other hand, De Vincentiis 
(2010) and Kerl (2011) find no effect of analyst affiliation on target price accuracy. 
Evidence on analyst ability is also limited. Bradshaw et al. (2012) find evidence of 
persistent differential forecasting ability, but report that the differential abilities are 
economically trivial. Using the number of equity reports issued by an analyst to proxy for 
analyst experience, Bonini et al. (2010) hypothesize that more experience leads to higher 
target price accuracy, following the learning curve hypothesis, but fail to find significant 
supporting evidence. De Vincentiis (2010), however, shows that the number of firms the 
analyst covers and analyst company-specific experience improve target price accuracy. 
Demirakos et al. (2010) present evidence of analyst ability to make intelligent valuation 
model choices. Their evidence suggests that analysts select a valuation model that is 
appropriate to the difficulty of the valuation task and that accuracy does not vary with 
valuation model choice after accounting for this.  
The literature also examines factors relating to company risk. Evidence on the effect 
of company size on target price accuracy is mixed. Some research shows that size 
reduces forecast accuracy (Bonini et al., 2010) while other research finds that target 
prices are more accurate for larger companies (Demirakos et al., 2010; Kerl, 2011). 
Bonini et al. (2010) find that momentum and loss making firms are associated with 
higher forecast errors. Stock price volatility reduces accuracy according to Demirakos et 
al. (2010), De Vincentiis (2010), and Kerl (2011). Information uncertainty is also likely 
to influence analyst behavior. Evgeniou et al. (2010) show that low ability analysts tend 
to herd when information uncertainty is low while they deviate significantly from the 
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consensus when information uncertainty is high. In contrast, high ability analysts tend 
not to change their degree of deviation from the consensus when information uncertainty 
is high. Evgeniou et al. suggest that low ability analysts are willing to take a risk when 
information uncertainty is high because high ability analysts are also likely to have high 
forecast errors due to the uncertain information environment.  
The above studies neglect the effect of a fundamental determinant of analyst forecast 
quality, namely the quality of analyst information as reflected in their valuation model 
inputs (Pope, 2003). In this study, we examine whether the disclosure of cash flow 
forecasts by an analyst improves the analyst’s target price accuracy. Analyst began 
including cash flow forecasts in their equity reports relatively recently. On the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), cash flow forecasts started appearing 
alongside earnings forecasts in 1993, although in the early years only a few reports 
included them. Cash flow forecasts accompanying earnings forecasts on I/B/E/S 
increased from 1 percent in 1993 to 15 percent in 1999 (DeFond and Hung, 2003) and to 
32 percent in 2005 (Call et al., 2009). Asquith et al. (2005) provide a detailed description 
of the typical analyst report based on a content analysis of 1,126 equity reports (of which 
72.6 percent include target prices) issued by Institutional Investor’s All-American 
Research Team between 1997 and 1999. They find that 17.1 percent disclose cash flow 
forecasts, comparable to the findings of DeFond and Hung (2003). 
Although several researchers have examined the role and properties of cash flow 
forecasts,
4
 Mangen (2013) observes that this research is still in its infancy. Recent 
literature suggests that issuing cash flow forecasts is not a random decision, nor a simple 
time trend. DeFond and Hung (2003) study the determinants of the selective supply of 
cash flow forecasts and attribute it to market participants’ demand. They find that the 
                                                          
4
 See, for example, Govindarajan (1980), Defond and Hung (2003), Hodder et al. (2008), Call et al. (2009), 
Givoly et al. (2009), McInnis and Collins (2011), and Pae and Yoon (2012). 
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decision to issue cash flow forecasts depends on firm-specific factors, primarily proxies 
for uncertainty facing the firm, heterogeneous accounting choices, and financial distress. 
They show that the demand for cash flow forecasts increases when information on 
earnings alone is insufficient to assess firm value. Lehavy (2009), however, argues that 
their response-to-investor-demand explanation is questionable given Givoly et al.’s 
(2009) evidence that analysts’ cash flow forecasts are unsophisticated.  
Givoly et al. (2009) argue that cash flow forecasts are ‘naïve extensions’ of earnings 
forecasts and can be derived by adding back depreciation and working capital changes to 
earnings. They also question the usefulness of cash flow forecasts given their low 
accuracy compared with earnings forecasts. Challenging this, Call et al. (2009) show that 
disclosing cash flow forecasts improves the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Lehavy (2009), commenting on the contradictory findings, highlights robustness 
concerns in support of the view that cash flow forecasts are unsophisticated. Call et. al. 
(2013a) investigate the accruals adjustments that analysts make to forecast their cash 
flows and provide evidence on the sophistication of these forecasts. They show that 
analysts incorporate meaningful estimates of working capital and other accruals to 
reconcile earnings to cash flow forecasts. Further, they find a significant market reaction 
to analyst cash flow forecast revisions incremental to the reaction to earnings forecast 
revisions. Givoly et al. (2013) argue that Call et al.’s (2013a) results are based on 
inappropriate benchmarks and tests of the sophistication of analyst cash flows. They 
note, however, that their findings that analyst cash flow forecasts are unsophisticated do 
not imply that analysts lack the necessary expertise and knowledge to perform their job, 
rather that accurately forecasting the components necessary to reconcile earnings to cash 
flows is a difficult task.
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The literature suggests that the usefulness of analysts’ cash flow forecasts is 
contentious and the question of their sophistication is open to judgement (Call et al., 
2013b). Recent studies by Mohanram (2014) and Radhakrishnan and Wu (2014), 
however, show how the increasing incidence of cash flow forecasts has helped mitigate 
accruals mispricing. Their results suggest that the presence of analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts for a firm enable investors to price that firm more accurately. We complement 
this research by examining whether an analyst improves the accuracy of her target price 
when she also discloses a cash flow forecast. Using propensity score matching (PSM), 
we analyze the performance of analyst target prices accompanied by cash flow forecasts 
during 2000–2010. The analysis shows that an analyst’s target price accuracy improves 
when the analyst accompanies this with a cash flow forecast.   
Our results are relevant for users of sell-side analyst research, academics, investors, 
and companies. We expect our findings to improve our understanding of the determinants 
of analyst target price accuracy and to add to our understanding of the properties of 
analyst target prices. Our findings shed light on the value and sophistication of analyst 
cash flow forecasts. Understanding the value of cash flow forecasts for target price 
valuation is relevant to investors. Demirakos et al. (2010) report that the choice of 
discounted cash flow (DCF) or price-to-earnings (PE) valuation models does not affect 
the quality of analyst target prices after controlling for the difficulty of the valuation task. 
Moreover, the current evidence on how the quality of valuation inputs affects valuation 
outcomes is based only on earnings forecasts. For a sample of 45,693 target prices during 
1997 through 2003, Gleason et al. (2013) find that the profitability of target prices 
derived from price/earnings to growth ratio (PEG) valuation is significantly lower than 
the profitability of target prices derived from residual-income valuation (RIV). They 
show that using low quality earnings forecasts as valuation model inputs reduces the 
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profitability of analyst target prices and the difference in profitability between the two 
valuations. By testing how cash flow forecasts affect analyst valuations, we offer insights 
into the analyst ‘black box’ that researchers attempt to penetrate. 
2. Research hypotheses  
Research shows that cash flows and accounting earnings are each incrementally 
useful in assessing firm value (e.g., Bowen et al., 1987; Ali, 1994; Dechow, 1994). In the 
analyst literature, Gleason et al. (2013) find that the profitability of target prices 
deteriorates when using low quality earnings forecasts as valuation inputs. Call et al. 
(2009) show that the accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts improves in the presence of 
cash flow forecasts. But there is no evidence on the effect of analyst cash flow forecasts 
and the quality of these forecasts on target price accuracy.    
Recent findings by Mohanram (2014) suggest that the increasing incidence of 
analyst cash flow forecasts is responsible for the recent decline in the accruals anomaly. 
When analysts forecast cash flows, they provide implicit forecasts of future accruals. 
Mohanram argues that if the accruals anomaly results from accruals mispricing then the 
presence of information on expected future accruals, in the form of analyst cash flow 
forecasts, should help reduce the mispricing. Radhakrishnan and Wu (2014) provide 
support for these findings.   
Complementing this research, we examine the benefit to the analyst of providing a 
cash flow forecast in terms of the effect on the accuracy of target prices. We hypothesize 
that an analyst’s target price accuracy is higher if the analyst also provides a cash flow 
forecast. Our hypothesis assumes that the quality of valuation model inputs affects the 
reliability of the valuation process. It is also based on the finding that the presence of 
cash flow forecasts increases the quality of analyst earnings forecasts, which is another 
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key input to analyst valuations. We therefore expect the presence of cash flow forecasts 
to improve the quality of analyst valuations. This leads to our first hypothesis:   
H1: An analyst’s target price is more accurate if the analyst also provides a cash flow 
forecast.  
We next hypothesize that the increase in target price accuracy is stronger when cash 
flow forecasts are more accurate. Given the evidence of Givoly et al. (2009) that analyst 
cash flow forecasts are not useful to market participants because of their low quality, it is 
possible that cash flow forecasts as a valuation model input introduce additional bias to 
analyst target prices. However, if analyst cash flow forecasts are accurate, they should 
result in higher target price quality. We therefore differentiate between accurate and 
inaccurate cash flow forecasts and their effects on target price accuracy. We test the 
following second hypothesis:    
H2: An analyst’s target price accuracy increases with the accuracy of the analyst’s cash 
flow forecast.  
3. Data and sample  
We obtain one-year-ahead cash flow forecasts for US stocks from the I/B/E/S detail 
file. We focus on one-year forecasts because cash flow forecasts on I/B/E/S are mostly 
annual. We merge these with target prices from the I/B/E/S target price file based on 
company ticker, estimator ID, analyst mask code, and announcement date. For each 
observation, we calculate target price accuracy as the absolute value of the difference 
between the target price and the stock price at the end of the target price forecast horizon 
divided by the current market price.
5
 Observations that have a target price (TP) and a 
cash flow forecast (CFF) belong to the CFF group, while observations that have only TP 
                                                          
5
 The literature uses several target price accuracy measures (see, for example, Asquith et al., 2005; 
Demirakos et al., 2010; Bradshaw et al., 2012; Bonini et al., 2010; De Vincentiis, 2010). We follow 
Demirakos et al. (2010) in calculating our (inverse) accuracy measure.  
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belong to the no-CFF group. A check of the dataset shows that no analyst–company pairs 
in the no-CFF group have any cash flow forecast observations by the same analyst for the 
same company at a different date in the dataset. This eliminates any ambiguity regarding 
observations in the no-CFF group. We obtain the target price consensus forecast, used in 
some of the analyses below, from the I/B/E/S summary file. Return data are from CRSP. 
Financial statement information and footnote data are from Compustat.  
Table 1 shows the final sample distribution. The sample covers January 2000 to 
December 2010 and includes 4,387 firms in 48 industries (according to the Fama and 
French, 1997, industry classification), 7,114 security analysts, and 597 research 
departments. The sample size is 420,813 observations. The number of observations 
including a CFF is 43,044, comprising about 10 percent of the sample. The observations 
with a CFF cover 2,057 firms for 1,755 analysts working for 270 research departments. 
The percentage of CFF observations in the sample increases from 4 percent in 2000 to 
almost 15 percent in 2010.
6
  
4. Research design  
We want to measure the impact of a disclosing a CFF on an analyst’s TP accuracy. 
Since we do not observe the counterfactual TP accuracy (i.e., the no-CFF TP accuracy 
for a CFF observation), we cannot evaluate the effects of a CFF by comparing outcome 
differences for a given treatment. Previous studies suggest that the analyst decision to 
provide a CFF is not random, so that the impact of a CFF on TP accuracy is unlikely to 
be homogeneous. Consequently, estimating the effect of a CFF on TP accuracy using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is biased and suffers from identification problems. To 
eliminate the selection bias, we use propensity score-matching to balance observed 
                                                          
6
 The percentage of CFF observations is lower than in previous literature because we require our sample 
observations to include a target price forecast.  
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differences between groups. We then run a multivariate regression on the matched 
sample to achieve higher efficiency and double filtering. This combined analysis should 
be more robust and has the potential to significantly improve the quality of the results.  
To compute the propensity scores, we first estimate the probability that a company–
analyst observation includes a CFF using the following logistic regression,  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6




i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
CFF
β β Accrual β AltmanZ β Buy β Capital β EVol β Freq
β InstOwn β Lev β MCap β nAnal β Sell β Star
β StrBuy u
 
     
     
 
 (1) 
The propensity score model estimates the conditional probability of a CFF given 
observable features of analysts and the company. CFF is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether observation i includes a CFF. The explanatory variables are the covariates 
determining the analyst decision to forecast cash flows. The first set of explanatory 
variables follows DeFond and Hung’s (2003) investor demand hypothesis. The 
magnitude of accruals (Accruals) captures the degree of earnings uncertainty. Large 
accruals increase market suspicion, making cash flow information valuable for 
interpreting the information in earnings. Altman’s Z-score (AltmanZ) measures a 
company’s financial health, where lower Z-scores indicate worse financial health 
(Altman, 1968). Cash flow forecasts should be more important for assessing the value of 
companies in worse financial health. Capital intensity (Capital) is the level of fixed 
assets in the company. When capital intensity is high, cash flow information is useful for 
assessing a firm’s liquidity. The natural logarithm of the company’s equity market value 
(MCap) controls for the company’s information environment. Earnings volatility (EVol) 
captures earnings quality. According to DeFond and Hung (2003), analysts are more 
likely to issue cash flow forecasts for firms with larger absolute accruals, high capital 
intensity, low Z-scores, and high earnings volatility. 
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The second set of explanatory variables controls for analyst characteristics. Evidence 
in Ertimur and Stubben (2005) suggests that analyst characteristics can influence their 
incentives to forecast cash flows. We therefore include variables related to analyst 
incentives: analyst forecasting frequency (Freq), an institutional investor star analyst 
dummy (Star), institutional ownership (InstOwn), and the number of analysts following 
the firm (nAnal). We include stock recommendation categories (StrongBuy, Buy, Sell) to 
control for the sensitivity of target price accuracy to analyst recommendations. We also 
include leverage (Lev) to control for a company’s financial performance.7 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables in the model for the full sample 
and for the treatment and control groups of CFF and no-CFF observations, as well as the 
results of mean and median differences tests between the two samples. The significant 
differences in means and medians between the two groups call for controlling using 
matching methods. The summary statistics for all variables in the model raise no 
particular concerns for the implementation of the propensity score analysis.  
Using propensity score matching, we match CFF to no-CFF observations based on 
the estimated propensity score. We then estimate the following multivariate regression of 
the effect of CFF on TP accuracy on the matched sample, controlling for analyst fixed 
effects,   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14
i
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i
TPerr
β βCFF β Accruals β AltmanZ β Buy β Capital β EVol
β Freq β InstOwn β Lev β MCap β nAnal β Sell
β Star β StrBuy u

     
     
  
 (2) 
The dependent variable is our measure of inverse target price accuracy (TPerr). The 
parameter of main interest in this model is 1 ; if target price observations with cash flow 
forecasts are more accurate, we expect to observe a negative coefficient on the CFF 
                                                          
7
 Table 2 provides precise definitions of all the study variables in the main analysis. 
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dummy. A negative coefficient suggests that target price error is lower for observations 
that have analyst cash flow forecasts, compared with the target price error of 
observations with no cash flow forecasts.  
To test our second hypothesis of whether cash flow accuracy is associated with 
analyst target price accuracy, we estimate the following multivariate regression of target 
price accuracy on cash flow forecast accuracy.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
13 14
i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i
TPerr
β βCFFerr β Accrual β AltmanZ β Buy β Capital β EVol
β Freq β InstOwn β Lev β MCap β nAlys β Sell
β Star β StrBuy u

     
     
  
  (3) 
We estimate the cash flow forecast error CFFerr (inverse accuracy) as the absolute value 
of the difference between the cash flow forecast and the actual cash flow per share as 
reported by the IBES Detail History – Actuals file for the relevant end of forecast period, 
divided by the stock price at the time of the forecast. If target prices are more accurate 
when analysts make more accurate cash flow forecasts, we should observe a positive 
coefficient on the cash flow forecast error. This would suggest that lower cash flow 
forecast errors lead to lower target price errors. 
5. Empirical estimation and results 
 We first conduct a univariate analysis of the differences in firm characteristics 
between observations with and without cash flow forecasts. Table 4, panel A compares 
the magnitude of accruals, Z-score, capital intensity, earnings volatility, institutional 
ownership, leverage, market capitalization, number of analysts following, and target 
price error for the two groups. On average, analysts issue cash flow forecasts for 
companies with larger absolute accruals, lower Z-scores, higher capital intensity, higher 
earnings volatility, and larger market capitalization, consistent with previous findings in 
the literature. We also find that companies with cash flow forecasts have a larger analyst 
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following and higher levels of leverage and institutional ownership, on average. 
Moreover, target price accuracy is higher for companies with cash flow forecasts. These 
significant differences support our argument that the analyst decision to forecast cash 
flows is not random. According to the correlation matrix of the variables (not tabulated), 
there is a high correlation of 0.68 between company size and analyst following as 
expected. The correlations between other variables do not raise any concerns of 
multicollinearity for the regression analysis. Multicollinearity is not an issue for the 
propensity score matching estimation because estimating the effects of individual 
covariates is not the main aim.  
We also conduct a univariate analysis of the difference in target price accuracy 
between observations with high and low cash flow forecast error (inverse accuracy). We 
classify observations below the 25
th
 percentile of CFFerr as observations with low cash 
flow forecast error and observations above the 75
th
 percentile as observations with high 
cash flow forecast error. Table 4, panel B presents the differences in mean and median 
between the two groups. The average target price error is 0.560 for observations in the 
high CFF error group, compared with 0.413 for the low CFF error group. The difference 
between the two means is significant as is the difference in median target price accuracy. 
This suggests that target price accuracy is likely to be higher for observations with higher 
cash flow forecast accuracy. We also test the univariate difference in target price 
accuracy between observations with above and below mean cash flow forecast error of 
0.03. Table 4, panel B shows that observations with above average CFF error have a 
mean target price error of 0.548 while observations with below average CFF error have a 
mean target price error of 0.417. Differenced in means and median between the two 
groups are significant.  
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Table 5 reports the results of the logistic regression estimation of equation (1). 
Consistent with DeFond and Hung (2003) and our univariate analysis, Altman’s Z-score 
is negatively associated with the analyst decision to disclose a CFF, while absolute 
accruals, earnings volatility, capital intensity, and size are positively associated with CFF 
disclosure. This suggests that analysts disclose cash flow forecasts for firms with weaker 
financial health, more volatile earnings, higher capital intensity, and larger market 
capitalization. Moreover, the results indicate that analysts are more likely to provide cash 
flow forecasts for firms with higher level of institutional ownership and companies that 
are followed by a larger number of analysts (i.e., more visible firms). Analysts are more 
likely to provide cash flow forecasts for companies they cover for more frequently. There 
is a negative association between analyst star ranking and the incidence of cash flow 
forecast. This is a result that the literature has not been previously examined. A possible 
explanation is that analysts provide cash flow forecasts when there are factors that call 
for improving for their earnings forecasts. If non-Star analysts are more likely to make 
earnings forecasts that are of a lower quality then they have more incentive to 
supplement their earnings with cash flow forecasts.   
We use the results of the logistic regression to estimate the propensity score for each 
observation in the sample. The propensity score is the conditional probability of an 
analyst providing a cash flow forecast for a particular observation. We use the propensity 
score to identify matched pairs of observations in the CFF and no-CFF groups.
8
 We then 
assess the covariate balance between the matched observations using several measures. 
We conduct t-tests of the equality of means in the CFF and no-CFF groups after 
matching. Untabulated results indicate that the matching algorithm successfully balances 
                                                          
8
 We perform this matching with psmatch2 of Leuven and Sianesi (2003), which uses a nearest-neighbour 
matching method, beginning with the treated subject with the highest (and thus most difficult to match 
propensity score) and proceeding to the subject with the lowest propensity score. The results are not 
sensitive to this choice of matching method.  
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most of the covariates; most t-tests are insignificant (p > 0.1). This is consistent with tests 
based on the standardized bias and the reduction in bias achieved after matching; the 
standardized bias is the difference in the sample means of the CFF and no-CFF groups as 
a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the two groups. 
After matching, the bias falls significantly for most covariates. Therefore, the matched 
sampling methodology helps reduce bias due to the observed covariates. We combine 
this propensity score matching method with regression adjustments as an effective 
method for ensuring that we eliminate differences in the propensity scores while using 
information about the association between the different covariates and the dependent 
variable.  
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation 2 to test our first hypothesis of the 
association between cash flow forecast availability and target price accuracy. For 
comparison purposes, we report the results of OLS estimation without any matching or 
control for selection bias in column 1. The results show a negative association between 
cash flow availability and target price error. This implies that the presence of a cash flow 
forecast reduces the target price forecast error. The coefficients on the other covariates in 
the estimation suggest that target price error falls for firms with more institutional 
ownerships holdings and for larger companies. On the other hand, target price error is 
higher for Star analysts and when the analyst provides higher coverage for a particular 
company. Moreover, target price error increases for companies with more volatile and 
uncertain earnings and companies with a larger analyst following.  
Next, we use the matched sample from the propensity score estimation and combine 
it with various regression adjustments. Columns 2–4 report the estimation of the model 
after matching. Combining regression with matching involves running the chosen 
regression model (e.g., the generalized linear model in column 2) with the matched 
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observations from the CFF and no-CFF groups and the propensity scores included as 
covariates in the regression. This regression-adjusted matching can protect against bias 
from model misspecification.
9
 Column 2 estimates the effect on target price accuracy 
using maximum likelihood estimation of a generalized linear regression model with a 
gamma distribution and a log link over the matched sample. The advantage of this 
approach is that it provides a more flexible approach that has the potential to address 
nonlinear relationships between covariates and the outcome variable. The generalized 
linear model analyzes the linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
mean of the dependent variable even when it is not reasonable to assume the data is 
distributed normally. Target price error falls in the presence of cash flow forecasts with 
CFF having a coefficient of −0.053 (p=0.000). The results on other covariates suggest 
target price error is lower for higher capital intensity, higher institutional ownership, and 
larger market capitalization.  
Column 3 estimates results using a propensity score linear model controlling for 
analyst fixed effects over the matched sample. Column 4 repeats the estimation of 
column 1 using OLS over the matched sample. The results in columns 3 and 4 are 
consistent with the GLM estimation. The coefficients on CFF are −0.058 and −0.071, 
both significant at p=0.000.  Moreover, the results of the estimation after matching are 
consistent with the results of the OLS regression. The results suggest that the availability 
of cash flow forecasts is associated with a reduction in analyst target price forecast error, 
consistent with our first hypothesis. 
To test our second hypothesis, we estimate equation (3) on the sample of analyst 
observations that include a cash flow forecast. When we conduct this estimation the 
sample size falls to 38,848 observations because not all observations contain a cash flow 
                                                          
9
 The propensity score matching method (without regression adjustment) assumes that the functional form 
of the propensity score regression model is correctly specified. 
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forecast and for some cash flow forecasts IBES does not report an actual cash flow for 
the forecast period end date, which we need to calculate the cash flow forecast error for 
each observation. Table 7, column 1 presents the results of the estimation. Consistent 
with our prediction, the coefficient on CFFerr of 1.1 suggests that analyst target prices 
accompanied by more accurate cash flow forecasts are more accurate. Table 7, column 2 
repeats the estimation, replacing CFFerr with a binary variable that takes the value 1 if 
analyst cash flow forecasts have a forecast error above the average CFFerr and zero 
otherwise. The results are consistent with column 1, suggesting that observations with 
above average cash flow forecast errors have higher target price forecast errors.  
The above results offer statistically significant evidence on the usefulness of analyst 
cash flow forecasts for target prices. Our results are also economically significant. First, 
using the coefficient on CFF from table 6, column 3, changing CFF from zero to one 
reduces the mean target price error by 12.34%. Second, a one standard deviation change 
in CFFerr reduces the target price error by 581.67 basis points and the mean target price 
error by 10.66%. 
6. Additional analysis  
We undertake several sensitivity tests and report the results in the text. Bradshaw et 
al. (2012) find that target prices tend to be more accurate in up than down markets. We 
test the sensitivity of our results to this control. Similar to Bradshaw et al. (2012), we use 
the sign of the realized S&P500 return over the forecast horizon to classify up and down 
markets. Up markets span the second halves (July–December) of 2002–2006, 2008, and 
2009. All other periods are down markets. We add the variable Up, which takes the value 
1 for up markets and zero otherwise, to equations (2) and (3). Consistent with previous 
findings, Up is negatively associated with target price error, confirming evidence that 
target price error is lower during up markets. However, the results do not affect the sign 
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or magnitude of the coefficients on our main variables (CFF and CFFerr) in equations 2 
and 3. We also test the sensitivity of our results to controlling for temporal effects and for 
previous findings that cash flow forecast accuracy declines over time. We add time fixed 
effects to our models and introduce two control variables HorizonCF for cash flows and 
HorizonTP for target prices, where Horizon equals the number of months to the end of 
the forecast period. Our results are not affected by these additional controls and both 
HorizonCF and HorizonTP do not have significant coefficients in most regressions after 
controlling for time fixed effects.  
We also test the sensitivity of our results to alternative explanations for why analysts 
make cash flow forecasts. Givoly et al. (2009) challenge the validity of DeFond and 
Huang’s (2003) demand hypothesis. Our paper does not set out to test the demand 
hypothesis, rather we use the results from the demand hypothesis only to identify control 
variables that, based on theory, are likely to affect the analyst decision to report a CFF. 
Table 5 shows that all the demand hypothesis variables are significant, so the choice to 
include a CFF or not appears to have a rational theoretical underpinning. Givoly et al., 
however, argue that market demand may not be the ‘major’ reason for the increasing 
availability of cash flow forecasts. For example, they point out a strong industry 
concentration in the availability of cash flow forecasts, with the energy industry having 
the highest concentration. We examine whether our two hypothesis tests are affected by 
removing observations from the Energy sector to check if this industry drives our results. 
Doing this does not change the results we report in the main analysis.  
In addition to the above concerns, Givoly et al. (2009) argue that the availability of 
cash flow forecasts simply follows an upward time trend. We therefore test whether our 
results hold if we estimate our regressions on three samples: the first covers 2000 to 
2003, during which there are fewer cash flow forecast observations than in later periods. 
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The second covers 2004 to 2006 and the third 2007 to 2010. We find consistent results 
with all coefficients on CFF and CFFerr having the same sign and significance as the 
estimation on the full sample. This suggests that our results are not driven by changes 
occurring over time. 
The analysis to this point compares analyst target price accuracy accompanied or 
unaccompanied by a cash flow forecast. However, there are instances when an analyst 
provides a target price unaccompanied by a cash flow forecast but for a company that has 
cash flow forecasts by other analysts in the forecast period. We therefore test the 
sensitivity of our results to the availability of cash flow forecasts by other analysts for a 
particular company. We add the control variable Other-CFF, which takes the value 1 if a 
company for a particular observation receives cash flow forecasts by another analyst in 
the forecast period, and zero otherwise. This additional control provides insights into 
whether the target price accuracy of analysts who do not offer cash flow forecasts benefit 
from the availability of cash flow forecasts by other analysts. It also controls for evidence 
on the effect of general cash flow forecast availability in correcting mispricing 
(Mohanram, 2014; Radhakrishnan and Wu, 2014). We find that our main results are 
unaffected by including this additional control variable. The results remain significant 
after matching and have the expected sign and magnitude. The control Other-CFF has a 
negative and significant coefficient, indicating that the availability of cash flow forecasts 
by other analysts provides additional improvement in analyst target price accuracy.  
7. Conclusion   
Bradshaw (2011) highlights the need for more research on the analysis that financial 
analysts undertake. While analysts’ decision processes and how they perform their 
analysis and estimate target prices are unobservable, our study meets this need by 
exploring the effect of analyst valuation input quality on target prices. We investigate 
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whether analyst target prices are more accurate when analysts make cash flow forecasts 
than when they do not. Our study is the first to examine the effect of cash flow disclosure 
and quality on target price accuracy and contributes to our understanding of the link 
between cash flow forecast disclosures and target prices.  
 Additionally, we conjecture that an analyst’s target price accuracy is higher when the 
analyst discloses a more accurate cash flow forecast. We model the relation between 
analyst target price accuracy and cash flow forecast disclosure and also between target 
price accuracy and cash flow forecast quality. We analyze a sample of US stocks with 
target prices and cash flow forecasts on I/B/E/S between 2000 and 2010 and find a 
positive association between analysts’ cash flow disclosure and target price accuracy.  
Our study contributes to the literature on analyst target prices and cash flows. 
Forecasting cash flows can be a sophisticated process, involving the use and processing 
of accounting information. Studying the implications of this process for valuation is 
essential to understanding how analysts, as financial intermediaries, perform their job of 
facilitating the flow of information to the capital market. Awareness of how analyst stock 
valuations are affected by the quality of the valuation model inputs is of interest to a 
broad audience of investors, companies, researchers, and analysts.  
  
    22 
 
References 
Ali, A., 1994. The incremental information content of earnings, working capital from 
operations, and cash flows. Journal of Accounting Research 32, 61–74. 
Altman, E. I., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of 
corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23, 589–609. 
Asquith, P., Mikhail, M. B., Au, A. S., 2005. Information content of equity analyst 
reports. Journal of Financial Economics 75, 245–282. 
Bianchini, R., Bonini, S., Salvi, A., Zanetti, L., 2008. Portfolio returns and target prices. 
Unpublished working paper, Bocconi University.  
Bonini, S., Pavesi, F. and Scotti, M. (2011). Financial analysts and collective reputation: 
theory and evidence. Working Paper, Bocconi University. 
Bonini, S., Zanetti, L., Bianchini, R., Salvi, A., 2010. Target price accuracy in equity 
research. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 37, 1177–1217. 
Bowen, R. M., Burgstahler, D., Daley, L. A., 1987. The incremental information content 
of accruals versus cash flows. The Accounting Review 62, 723–747. 
Bradshaw, M. T., 2011. Analysts' forecasts: What do we know after decades of work? 
Accounting Horizons, forthcoming. 
Bradshaw, M. T., Brown, L. D., Huang, K., 2012. Do sell-side analysts exhibit 
differential target price forecasting ability? Review of Accounting Studies, 
forthcoming.  
Brav, A., Lehavy, R., 2003. An empirical analysis of analysts' target prices: Short-term 
informativeness and long-term dynamics. Journal of Finance 58, 1933–1968. 
Call, A. C., Chen, S., Tong, Y. H., 2009. Are earnings forecasts accompanied by cash 
flow forecasts more accurate? Review of Accounting Studies 14, 358–391.  
Call, A.C., Chen, S., Tong, Y.H., 2013a. Are analysts' cash flow forecasts naive 
extensions of their own earnings forecasts? Contemporary Accounting Research 
30, 438–465. 
Call, A.C., Chen, S., Tong, Y.H., 2013b. The debate over the sophestication of analysts' 
cash flow forecasts and a correction of Givoly, Hayn, and Lehavy (2013). 
Unpublished working paper. 
Da, Z., Schaumburg, E., 2011. Relative valuation and analyst target price forecasts. 
Journal of Financial Markets 14, 161–192.  
    23 
 
Dechow, P. M., 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 
18, 3–42. 
DeFond, M. L., Hung, M., 2003. An empirical analysis of analysts’ cash flow forecasts. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 35, 73–100.  
Demirakos, E. G., Strong, N. C., Walker, M., 2010. Does valuation model choice affect 
target price accuracy? European Accounting Review 19, 35–72.  
Ertimur, Y., Stubben, S. R., 2005. Analysts’ incentives to issue revenue and cash flow 
forecasts. Unpublished working paper, Stanford University. 
Fama, E. F., French, K. R., 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial 
Economics 43, 153–193.  
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., Lehavy, R., 2009. The quality of analysts’ cash flow forecasts. The 
Accounting Review 84, 1877–1911.  
Givoly, D., Hayn, C., Lehavy, R., 2013. Analysts' cash flow forecasts are not 
sophisticated: a rebuttal of Call, Chen and Tong (2013). Unpublished working 
paper. 
Gleason, C. A., Johnson, W. B., Li, H., 2013. Valuation model use and the price target 
performance of sell-side equity analysts. Contemporary Accounting Research 30, 
80–115. 
Govindarajan, V., 1980. The objectives of financial statements: An empirical study of the 
use of cash flow and earnings by security analysts. Accounting Organisation and 
Society 5, 383–392.  
Hodder, L. D., Hopkins, P. E., Wood, D. A. 2008. The effects of financial statement and 
informational complexity on analysts’ cash flow forecasts. The Accounting Review 
83, 915–956. 
Kerl, A. G., 2011. Target price accuracy. Business Research 4, 74–96.  
Lehavy, R., 2009. Discussion of "Are earnings forecasts more accurate when 
accompanied by cash flow forecasts?" Review of Accounting Studies 14, 392–400. 
Leuven, E., and Sianesi, B., 2003. Psmatch2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis 
and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance 
testing.http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. Version 1.2.3. 
Mangen, C. 2013. Discussion of “Are analysts’ cash flow forecasts naïve extensions of 
their own earnings forecasts?” Contemporary Accounting Research 30, 466–481. 
McInnis, J. M., Collins, D. W., 2011. The effect of cash flow forecasts on accrual quality 
and benchmark beating. Journal of Accounting and Economics 51, 219–239.  
    24 
 
Mohanram, P.S., 2014. Analysts' cash flow forecasts and the decline of the accruals 
anomaly. Contemporary Accounting Research 31, 1143–1170. 
Pae, J., Yoon, S., 2012. Determinants of analysts’ cash flow forecast accuracy. Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Finance 27, 123–144.  
Pope, P., 2003. Discussion of disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, 
and analysts’ forecast accuracy: an international study. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 41, 273–283. 
Radhakrishnan, S., Wu, S. 2014. Analysts' Cash flow forecasts and accrual mispricing. 
Contemporary Accounting Research 31, 1191-1219.  





Full Sample CFF observations  
No-CFF 
observations   
Companies 4,387 2,057 4,368 
Analysts 7,114 1,755 6,962 
Research departments  597 270 586 
   
Year Full sample CFF observations 
No-CFF  
observations  
2000 20,489 918 19,571 
2001 25,425 578 24,847 
2002 30,472 846 29,626 
2003 31,854 2,361 29,493 
2004 34,647 3,461 31,186 
2005 34,815 4,043 30,772 
2006 37,527 3,896 33,631 
2007 40,696 4,315 36,381 
2008 52,074 6,625 45,449 
2009 53,281 7,537 45,744 
2010 59,533 8,464 51,069 
Total 420,813 43,044 377,769 
Notes:  
The table presents the sample distribution by cash flow forecast availability group for companies, 
analysts, and research departments. The lower part of the table gives the sample observations by 
year. 
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Table 2 
Variable definitions  
Variable  Variable name Definition  
Accruals Magnitude of 
accruals 
The absolute value of net income before extraordinary items 
minus operating cash flows divided by total assets.  
AltmanZ Altman’s Z score Z = 1.2(Net working capital/Total assets) + 1.4(Retained 
earnings/Total assets) + 3.3(Earnings before interest and 
taxes/Total assets) + 0.6(Market value of equity/Book value of 




Equals one when the analyst stock recommendation is Buy, zero 
otherwise.  
 
Capital  Capital intensity  Gross property, plant and equipment divided by revenue.  
CFF Cash flow forecast 
dummy 
Equals 1 if the observation includes a cash flow forecast, zero 
otherwise.  
CFFerr Cash flow forecast 
error 
The absolute value of the difference between the analyst cash 
flow forecast minus the actual realized cash flow per share at 
the end of the forecast period, divided by the share market price 
at the time of forecast.   
EVol Earnings volatility  The natural logarithm of the standard deviation of earnings over 
the past four quarters, where earnings is total earnings before 




Equals one when the analyst stock recommendation is Hold, 




Total number of shares held by institutional investors divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding.  
Lev Leverage  The company’s debt-to-assets ratio for the year.   
MCap Market 
capitalization  
The natural logarithm of the company’s equity market value.  
nAnal Number of analysts 
following  
The I/B/E/S number of analysts following the company in the 
year.  
 
Freq Forecast frequency  The number of target price revisions issued by a given analyst 
for the company in the year.   
Sell Sell recommendation 
dummy  
Equals one when the analyst stock recommendation is Sell, 
zero otherwise.  
Star Star analyst dummy Equals one if the analyst is an Institutional Investor star 
analyst in the year before the release of the current analyst 
forecast, zero otherwise.  
StrBuy Strong buy 
recommendation 
dummy  
Equals one if the analyst stock recommendation is Strong 
Buy, zero otherwise.  
 
TPerr Target price forecast 
error 
The absolute value of the difference between the target price 
and the market price at the end of the forecast horizon 
divided by the current market price.  
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Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min 25
th
 Median 75th Max 
Accruals 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.10 11.45 
AltmanZ* 5.80 6.57 −2.74 2.19 3.85 6.74 39.07 
Buy 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Capital*  0.94 1.36 0.00 0.23 0.41 0.9 7.88 
CFFerr* 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.35 
CFF 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EVol 2.63 1.84 −4.73 1.30 2.54 3.88 11.12 
Freq 4.22 2.63 1.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 33.00 
Hold 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
InstOwn 0.70 0.22 0.00 0.59 0.75 0.87 1.00 
Lev 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.32 4.99 
MCap 14.69 1.72 7.14 13.47 14.6 15.86 20.14 
nAnal 13.19 7.97 1.00 7.00 12.00 18.00 53.00 
Sell 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Star 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
StrBuy 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
TPerr*  0.47 0.55 0.01 0.15 0.34 0.63 11.00 
Notes:  
Summary statistics for all variables in the study based on 420,813 observations. CFFerr summary statistics are 
based on 38,848 observations. Asterisked variables are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% levels to reduce 




Panel A: Comparison of firm characteristics 
 
Mean Median Mean difference Median difference 
 CFF No-CFF CFF No-CFF t-stat z-stat 
Accruals 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.06 −22.498 −44.268 
AltmanZ* 3.96 6.00 2.78 3.99 61.337 78.300 
Capital*  2.13 0.80 1.09 0.39 −200.000 −134.019 
EVol 3.13 2.57 3.08 2.48 −60.329 −58.969 
InstOwn 0.73 0.70 0.77 0.75 −24.370 −23.738 
Lev 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.18 −33.203 −48.410 
MCap 15.01 14.65 14.99 14.55 −40.885 −45.179 
nAnal 15.39 12.94 14.00 12.00 −60.640 −61.916 
TPerr*  0.45 0.47 0.33 0.34 7.608 4.732 
Panel B: Comparison of target price accuracy relative to cash flow forecast accuracy  
 
Mean Median Mean difference Median difference 
 High CFFerr Low CFFerr High CFFerr Low CFFerr t-stat  z-stat  
Obs. 9,712 9,712       
TPerr*  0.560 0.413 0.379 0.316 −19.072  −14.398  


















TPerr* 0.548 0.417 0.374 0.313 −24.81  −16.911  
Notes:  
Panel A: A comparison of the characteristics of companies covered by observations with and without cash flow forecasts, giving the means of firm characteristics and the results of 
mean and median differences tests. The full sample includes 420,813 observations. The numbers of CFF observations and no-CFF observations are 43,813 and 377,769. Table 2 
provides variable definitions. 
Panel B: Univariate analysis of the difference in target price accuracy between observations with high vs. low cash flow forecast error (inverse accuracy). High CFFerr denotes 
observations above the 75
th
 percentile of CFFerr (i.e., observations with high cash flow forecast error). Low CFFerr denotes observations below the 25
th
 percentile of CFFerr (i.e., 
observations with low cash flow forecast error). Above average CFFerr includes observations with CFFerr larger than the mean. Below average CFFerr includes observations with 
CFFerr below the mean. 






Propensity-score estimation using logistic regression  




































Pseudo R-squared 11.59% 
Wald χ2 28138.1 
[0.000] 
Obs. 420,813 
Notes: Logistic regression of CFF on the variables determining analyst 
choice to forecast cash flows and control variables. The output of this 
regression, the probability of forecasting cash flows, is used to calculate the 
propensity score. Table 2 provides variable definitions.  






Estimation of the effect of cash flow forecast availability on target price accuracy  
TPerr 1 2 3 4 
CFF −0.019*** −0.053*** −0.058*** −0.071*** 
 
(−3.31) (−7.75) (−12.85) (−15.72) 
Accruals 0.135*** 0.152*** 0.077*** 0.125*** 
 
(5.34) (12.51) (11.98) (7.09) 
AltmanZ 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 
 
(23.69) (46.64) (37.43) (32.90) 
Buy 0.040*** 0.103*** 0.038*** 0.057*** 
 
(11.07) (27.76) (17.62) (25.27) 
Capital 0.016*** −0.024*** −0.017*** −0.041*** 
 
(7.68) (−3.88) (−4.68) (−7.78) 
EVol 0.043*** 0.064*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 
 
(23.71) (51.05) (47.45) (40.51) 
Freq 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.004*** −0.002*** 
 
(6.36) (8.53) (7.05) (−3.22) 
InstOwn −0.233*** −0.408*** −0.220*** −0.311*** 
 
(−24.56) (−40.61) (−37.25) (−37.80) 
Lev 0.153*** 0.314*** 0.205*** 0.226*** 
 
(14.21) (28.40) (32.12) (24.61) 
MCap −0.133*** −0.248*** −0.135*** −0.138*** 
 
(−53.58) (−167.37) (−142.88) (−94.33) 
nAnal 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(22.45) (43.46) (25.85) (29.65) 
Sell 0.044*** 0.202*** 0.087*** 0.114*** 
 
(3.61) (14.41) (11.04) (12.01) 
Star 0.032*** 0.074*** 0.052*** 0.058*** 
 
(5.32) (16.01) (13.40) (18.98) 
StrBuy 0.059*** 0.162*** 0.080*** 0.098*** 
 
(13.84) (31.08) (25.93) (25.86) 
Constant 2.210*** 2.378*** 2.211*** 2.259*** 
 
(66.73) (126.77) (181.98) (114.44) 




Log likelihood  −79240.72    
N    420,813    420,813     420,813    420,813  
Notes: Column 1 estimates the effect of cash flow forecast availability on target price accuracy using OLS. 
Column 2 estimates the effect on target price accuracy using maximum likelihood estimation of a 
generalized linear model on the matched sample. Column 3 estimates results using a propensity score linear 
model controlling for analyst fixed effects on the matched sample. Column 4 repeats the estimation of 
column 1 using OLS on the matched sample. t-stats are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering by 
analysts and companies to adjust for within cluster correlation. Table 2 provides variable definitions. 













 Above average CFFerr  0.039*** 
  (7.13) 
Accruals 0.060*** 0.047** 
 
(3.17) (2.47) 
AltmanZ 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(3.39) (2.86) 
Buy 0.009* 0.008 
 
(1.68) (1.34) 
Capital −0.002 −0.003* 
 
(−0.95) (−1.66) 
EVol 0.002 0.009*** 
 
(0.95) (4.29) 
Freq 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(9.79)  (10.27) 
InstOwn −0.027** −0.044*** 
 
(−2.14) (−3.44) 
Lev 0.222*** 0.242*** 
 
(12.84) (13.94) 
MCap −0.087*** −0.103*** 
 (−29.34) (−35.13) 
nAnal 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (6.06) (7.18) 
Sell 0.006 0.01 
 (0.23) (0.38) 
Star 0.047*** 0.049*** 
 (4.14) (4.31) 
StrBuy 0.013* 0.012* 
 
(1.84) (1.67) 
Constant 1.576*** 1.819*** 
 
(37.41) (43.96) 
Analyst fixed effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 12.62% 12.71% 
N 38,848 38,848 
Notes: Column 1 estimates the effect of cash flow forecast error on target price accuracy using a fixed 
effects regression. Column 2 estimates the effect of above average CFFerr on target price accuracy. t-stats 
are based standard errors adjusted for clustering by analysts and companies to adjust for within cluster 
correlation. Table 2 provides variable definitions. 
 * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
